Mumbai riots a planned, perfected pogrom?
The popular belief is that the 1992-1993 riots in Mumbai were a spontaneous outpouring of anger at the demolition of Babri Masjid. That’s a myth—the riots were a pre-planned pogrom.
The seeds of the riots were sown during BJP leader L K Advani’s rathyatra in 1990. The build up to the Ramjanmabhoomi movement polarised the country along communal lines and the final provocation came when the Babri Masjid was demolished on December 6, 1992.
As Hindutva leaders took out rallies through Muslim areas in Mumbai rioting broke out. Neighbour turned against neighbour and Mumbai came to a halt.
The rioting engulfed Mumbai in two waves: 6-12 December 1992 and 6-20 January 1993. Over 900 people (575 Muslims and 275 Hindus) were killed and more than 2,000 were injured.
The rioters wore khaki
The Mumbai Police failed to control the riots and some of its some policemen actually aided rioters. Transcripts of wireless messages between police officials clearly prove they were communal and encouraged their colleagues to conduct and allow attacks on Muslim properties and spare Hindus.
Here are just some of the messages policemen sent:
“Landyala sodu noko! (Don't leave the Muslims);
Dongriwarna landyala sodu nakos (don’t leave the Muslims in Dongri)
Miyan la ka doodh vatatat aai jhavadya re saaley madarchod miyaan bohut bhen**** rehtey hai re! (Why hand out relief to the Muslims. They are such f******)
Maharashtrainche jadu naka—miyanche jada sala bhen*****. (Don’t burn the properties of Maharashtrains. Burn the ones belonging to the Muslims.)
At one point even senior police officials were abused on the airwaves for trying to contain the riots. “Why are senior officers supporting the Muslims. Tell them the Muslims are f******,” said one police official.
The Justice B N Srikrishna commission, which investigated the riots, says in its report: “the wireless communication equipment were not foolproof. This enabled communally affected policemen to successfully break into and intrude upon the police channels and transmit abusives.”
The seeds of the riots were sown during BJP leader L K Advani’s rathyatra in 1990. The build up to the Ramjanmabhoomi movement polarised the country along communal lines and the final provocation came when the Babri Masjid was demolished on December 6, 1992.
As Hindutva leaders took out rallies through Muslim areas in Mumbai rioting broke out. Neighbour turned against neighbour and Mumbai came to a halt.
The rioting engulfed Mumbai in two waves: 6-12 December 1992 and 6-20 January 1993. Over 900 people (575 Muslims and 275 Hindus) were killed and more than 2,000 were injured.
The rioters wore khaki
The Mumbai Police failed to control the riots and some of its some policemen actually aided rioters. Transcripts of wireless messages between police officials clearly prove they were communal and encouraged their colleagues to conduct and allow attacks on Muslim properties and spare Hindus.
Here are just some of the messages policemen sent:
“Landyala sodu noko! (Don't leave the Muslims);
Dongriwarna landyala sodu nakos (don’t leave the Muslims in Dongri)
Miyan la ka doodh vatatat aai jhavadya re saaley madarchod miyaan bohut bhen**** rehtey hai re! (Why hand out relief to the Muslims. They are such f******)
Maharashtrainche jadu naka—miyanche jada sala bhen*****. (Don’t burn the properties of Maharashtrains. Burn the ones belonging to the Muslims.)
At one point even senior police officials were abused on the airwaves for trying to contain the riots. “Why are senior officers supporting the Muslims. Tell them the Muslims are f******,” said one police official.
The Justice B N Srikrishna commission, which investigated the riots, says in its report: “the wireless communication equipment were not foolproof. This enabled communally affected policemen to successfully break into and intrude upon the police channels and transmit abusives.”
V N Deshmukh, who was Additional Commissioner of Police (Intelligence) in 1992-93, admits there were “disgruntled policemen” during the riots. "During that time there were some disgruntled policemen and they had a wireless set with them and they had gone into hiding somehwere and from there they were making wireless calls many times abusive," says Deshmukh.
The messages suggest that a communal police force disrupted Army relief operations and prevented supplies from reaching minority areas. The Srikrishna Commission was scathing in how poorly the army was used.
"There was utter confusion in effective utilization of army columns. Both in December 1992 and January 1993 the army could have been given an operational role which could have swiftly and decisively put an end to the communal riots," the report says.
Human rights activist Teesta Setalvad says policemen became rioters in Mumbai. “It was a clear infiltration of hate mongering entering into the wings of the state. Policemen became rioters--which had never happened before,” says Setalvad.
Courtsey : http://en.wikipedia.org
Saturday, September 12, 2009
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